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Recent Developments

Duvall v. McGee:
Tort Judgment Creditors Are Not Included in the Narrow Class of Creditors
Entitled to Invade a Spendthrift Trust
By: Kevin Trogdon

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held tort
judgment creditors are not included
in the narrow class of creditors
entitled to invade a spendthrift trust.
Duvall v. McGee, 375 Md. 476, 826
A.2d 416 (2003). The court determined the rationale underlying
decisions permitting invasion of a
spendthrift trust for payment of alimony' child support, or taxes are not
applicable to an obligation owed to
ordinary creditors. Id.
James McGee ("McGee") was
convicted of felony murder for his
participation in a robbery that resulted
in the death of Katherine Ryon
("Ryon"). Robert Duvall ("Duvall"),
Personal Representative ofRyon's
Estate, brought suit in the Circuit
Court for Anne Arundel County
seeking compensatory and punitive
damages. The parties executed a
settlement agreement for a judgment
against McGee.
The settlement agreement
acknowledgec McGee as the
beneficiary of a spendthrift trust
(''Trust'') established by his deceased
mother. Under the Trust's terms,
McGee was prohibited from alienating
Trust principal or any other portion of
the Trust while in the hands of the
Trustee, and specifically shielded
Trust principal and income from
McGee's creditors. Additionally,
periodic income payments were made

to McGee by the Trustee. Pursuant
to the settlement agreement, Duvall
was prohibited from attaching or
garnishing the periodic payments
made to McGee by the Trustee.
To satisfY the judgment entered
pursuant to the settlement agreement,
Duvall served a Writ of Garnishment
on the Trustee to invade the Trust
principal. Duvall moved for summary
judgment, arguing as a matter of
public policy tort judgment creditors
should be deemed a special class of
creditors entitled to invade a
spendthrift trust. The court denied
Duvall's motion for summary
judgment and granted McGee's
cross-motion. Duvall appealed to the
Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland; however before it was
heard, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland granted certiorari.
The court of appeals began its
analysis by recognizing spendthrift
trusts are valid instruments under
Maryland law. Id. at 483-84, 826
A.2d at 420. The court concluded
principal of a spendthrift trust is not
subject to garnishment while in the
hands of a trustee. Id. (citing Smith
v. Towers, 69 Md. 77, 14 A. 497
(1888». The court reasoned although
the right to sell and dispose of
property is a necessary incident to
absolute ownership of property, ''the
reasons on which the rule is founded
do not apply to the transfer of

property in trust." Id. at 485, 826
A.2d at 421 (quoting Smith, 69 Md.
at 87, 14A.2d at 499). Moreover,
the court determined the only restraint
on the right to dispose of trust
property is when it is in the best
interest ofthe community. Id.
As such, the court identified
three circumstances where it had
held, on public policy grounds,
spendthrift trusts may be invaded for
indebtedness: (1) alimony arrearage;
(2) child support; and (3) income tax.
Id. at 489, 826A.2dat423-24. The
court recognized a fundamental
difference between these obligations
and those of ordinary creditors. Id.
at 489,826 A.2d at 424. The court
reasoned a beneficiary's wife and
children are not creditors and the
beneficiary'S liability to support them
is not a debt. Id. at 493,826 A.2d
at 426. "The obligation to pay
alimony in a divorce proceeding is
regarded not as debt, but as a duty
growing out ofthe marital relation and
resting upon sound public policy." Id.
at 491, 826 A.2d at 425. Similarly,
the court recognized the obligation to
pay taxes is not considered debt, nor
is the government viewed as a mere
creditor. Id. at 493, 826A.2d at 426.
The court reasoned the obligation
owed to ordinary creditors, however,
grows out of contract, not statutory,
duty. Id. at 492,826 A.2d at 425.
Upon finding Ryon was only an
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ordinary creditor, the court held
McGee's obligation was dissimilar to
cases where invasion ofa spendthrift
trust was allowed for payment ofalimony, child support, or taxes. Id. at
493, 826 A.2d at 426.
Therefore, the court concluded
the Trust had no duty to Ryon'sestate.
Id. The court reasoned to allow the
invasion ofthe Trust for payment of
the tort judgment against McGee
frustrates the Trust donor's intent and
would, in effect, impose liability on the
Trust for the beneficiary's wrongful
acts. Id.
The court rejected Duvall's next
argument that certain creditors'
interests are great enough to usurp
spendthrift trust terms. Id. at 494,
826 A.2d at 427. The court opined
ordinary creditors are on notice of a
spendthrift trust when they voluntarily
extend credit and are able to regulate
conduct in light ofthis information Id.
at 499, 826 A.2d at 429. Although
the court admitted tort judgment
creditors are not on notice, ''that fact
alone does not make the claim ...
anything other than a debt or make its
exemption from the bar of a
spendthrift trust, a matter of public
policy." Id. at 500, 826A.2d at 430.
To support this conclusion, the court
focused on a Uniform Trust Act
section 503 comment that specifically
does not support including tort
judgment creditors among creditors
who can invade a spendthrift trust. Id.
at 500, 826A.2d at 416 n.15.
Finally, the court addressed
Duvall's argument that, as a matter of
public policy, McGee should not be
allowed to receive benefits from the
Trust to the exclusion ofhis creditors.
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Id. at 500, 826 A.2d at 430. The
court agreed Maryland public policy
does not endorse a system where
criminals derive financial benefit from
their illegal activity, as evidenced by
the "slayer's rule." Id. The court
concluded, however, that any benefit
McGee received from the Trust
vested prior to the commission ofhis
criminal acts and was completely
independent of his criminal conviction
Id. at 500-01, 826 A.2d at 430. The
court stated situations where criminals
were rewarded for criminal acts by
way of book, television, and movie
royalties were unlike this case because
McGee derived no benefit from his
criminal act. Id. Instead, the court
concluded McGee only benefited as
a life beneficiary under the Trust
executed by his deceased mother. Id.
at 501, 826 A.2d at 430-31.
In Duvall v. McGee, the Court
ofAppeals of Maryland declined to
expand the narrow class of creditors
allowed to invade spendthrift trusts.
By doing so, the court drew a "dutydebt" distinction for determining what
is commensurate with public policy.
As a result, this ruling preserves the
right of spendthrift trust beneficiaries
from having trust principal attached by
tort judgment creditors. Thus, the
court sent a message that unless a
beneficiary has a statutory duty, the
intent of a spendthrift trust settlor
trumps creditors' interests.
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